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Federalism and the Federal Criminal Law
CRAIG M. BRADLEY*
INTRODUCTION
In 1995 in United States v. Lopez,' and again in 2000 in United States
v. Morrison,' the Supreme Court struck down a federal statute as exceed-
ing Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. In Jones v. United
States,' the Court construed a third statute narrowly in order to avoid
"grave and doubtful constitutional questions."4 The statutes at issue in
Lopez (possession of a gun within one thousand feet of a school)' and
Jones (arson) 6 were criminal statutes. Although Morrison arose from a
civil suit under the Violence Against Women Act,7 the suit was based
upon a rape and the opinion focused on Congress's power "to regu-
late ... crime." 8
The combined effect of these three cases suggested a major rethink-
ing of the scope of federal criminal law and the reversal of substantial
numbers of convictions. At least that is what the commentators believed.
Shortly after Morrison was decided, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky
opined that "[Morrison] likely will lead to constitutional challenges to an
array of federal laws ranging from environmental to criminal to civil
rights statutes."9 Likewise, Professor John Baker averred that "[Morri-
son] casts constitutional doubt on much of federal criminal law....""
* James L. Calamaras Professor of Law, Indiana University (Bloomington) School of Law. The
author is a former Assistant United States Attorney, Washington, D.C., and Senior Trial Attorney,
Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice. The author would
like to thank Professor Allen Ides, Professor Dawn Johnsen, and Russell Carlberg, Esq. for their help-
ful comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
i. 514 U.S. 549.
2. 529 U.S. 598.
3. 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
4. Id. at 857 (quoting United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366,
408 (I9o9)).
5. Gun-Free School Zones Act, i8 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2000).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (20oo).
8. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (20o0).
9. Ewrin Chemerinsky, Shrinking Federal Powers, TIAL, Jan. 2001, at 82.
io. John S. Baker, Jr., United States v. Morrison and Other Arguments Against Federal "Hate
Crimes" Legislation, 80 B.U. L. REv. 1191, 1193 (2000).
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Finally, Professors Louis Virelli and David Leibowitz declared that
"Morrison erased nearly all doubts that the Court intends to reduce fed-
eral commerce power to a fraction of what it had become in the previous
sixty years.""
While my initial reaction to these cases was less dramatic, and I cer-
tainly did not feel that they "erased nearly all doubts" about anything, I
nevertheless agreed with these commentators' basic message. It appeared
that these decisions would likely have a significant effect on the scope of
federal criminal law. However, I also noted that, on their face, they did
not have a very profound effect. The statutes which the Court struck
down or narrowed were not statutes that I, as a former federal prosecu-
tor, felt were in any sense central to the federal law enforcement effort.
Neither the Gun-Free School Zones Act nor the Violence Against
Women Act are implicated in the most significant federal law enforce-
ment activities: prosecuting organized crime, corrupt public officials, far-
reaching fraud schemes, narcotics violations, terrorism, etc. Also, while
the arson statute certainly could sometimes be employed against organ-
ized crime or terrorists, the Court's continued acceptance of its use in
cases involving commercial property2 meant that the Jones case would
have only a limited direct impact.
The key question was, and remains, what impact these cases will
have on prosecutions under other statutes that have been used success-
fully by the federal government to prosecute its core concerns. The most
significant are the statues that I think of as "The Four Horsemen of the
Apocalypse" of federal criminal law: the Hobbs Act, 3 the Travel Act,'4
mail fraud, and RICO.'6 Will Lopez and its progeny significantly inter-
fere with the federal government's ability to prosecute under these stat-
utes or to achieve its major goals under other important laws? While the
Travel Act and the mail fraud statute are not placed in doubt by Lopez,
i i. Louis J. Virelli III & David S. Leibowitz, Federalism Whether They Want It or Not: The New
Commerce Clause Doctrine and the Future of Federal Civil Rights Legislation After United States v.
Morrison, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 926, 926 (2001). Accord, Christy H. Dral & Jerry J. Phillips, Commerce
by Another Name: The Impact of United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison, 68 TENN. L.
REV. 605, 605 (2001) ("[T]he potential impact of Lopez and Morrison is far-reaching and disturbing.").
See also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United States v. Morrison, I 4
HARV. L. REV. 135, 136 (2ooo) ("On a deeper level of law and politics, and against an historical back-
drop of the use of federalism to deny racial equality and enforce white supremacy, Morrison can be
seen to employ ostensibly gender-neutral tools to achieve a substantive victory for the social institu-
tion of male dominance.").
12. See Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848,853 (2000).
13. i8 U.S.C. § 1951 (20o0).
14. Id. § 1952.
15. Id. § 1341.
16. Id. §§ i96I-I968.
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RICO and the Hobbs Act, with their "affecting interstate commerce"
language, are in doubt. 7 In particular, the long held view of the courts of
appeals that the effect on commerce of a Hobbs Act violation need only
be "de minimis"'' 8 would appear to be at risk. Likewise, Lopez could per-
haps impose significant limits on narcotics and weapons prosecutions.
Surprisingly, the nearly unanimous answer from the federal courts to
date is: "No impact!" Very few cases have been reversed based on Lopez
or Morrison, though there is a conflict in the circuits concerning the child
pornography statute 9 and an equally divided en banc Fifth Circuit con-
cerning the Hobbs Act's continued viability.
20
This Article considers whether the lower courts have been correct in
their general refusal to extend Lopez and its progeny to other cases. I
conclude that, as to certain statutes, the lower courts have ignored the
Supreme Court's strong message and that a number of these statutes are
no longer valid. I thus reject the view of those (admittedly pre-Morrison)
commentators who argued that Lopez should have little impact." In par-
ticular, I argue that, contrary to the near unanimous views of the courts
of appeals, Lopez/Morrison/Jones impose significant limitations on the
government's ability to criminalize certain activity under the Commerce
Clause.22
But while Lopez and its progeny impose meaningful limitations on
federal criminal jurisdiction, these limitations do not strike at the heart of
the federal government's core concerns. A consideration of other Su-
preme Court cases shows that the Court's majority is not intent on exalt-
ing some ideal of what federal power should be over the practical
concerns of effective federal law enforcement. Rather, taking the Su-
preme Court's federal criminal law cases as a whole, it appears that the
Court's goal is to rein in federal jurisdiction in cases where the Court's
17. See infra Part 11.
18. See infra Part II.A.
i9. See infra Part II.C.
20. See infra Part II.A.
21. See, e.g., Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 643, 660 (1996)
(predicting that Lopez will not be significant because "in this century many aspects of our culture have
favored centralization"); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Fuzzy Logic of Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 685, 692 (1996) (arguing that "Lopez will have very little practical effect" because Congress can
still regulate any activity that is "a little more like commerce than the acts depicted by the government
in that case"). Although I disagree with her about certain specifics, Professor Kathleen F. Brickey was
closer to the mark in 1996 in citing the Violence Against Women Act as an extreme assertion of fed-
eral power that would put more pressure on the federal courts, and stating that Lopez "is a reminder
that, contrary to contemporary thought, congressional power under the Commerce Clause is not
unlimited...." Kathleen F. Brickey, Crime Control and the Commerce Clause, 46 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 8oi, 842-43 (1996).
22. See infra Part II.H.
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majority deems it unnecessary to the principal purposes and goals of fed-
eral law enforcement while not disturbing the government's ability to
vindicate its key concerns. 3
I. THE SUPREME COURT CASES
A. UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ
In Lopez, the defendant was a high school student who was caught
in school with a concealed handgun. The Court reversed his conviction
under the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990.24 This statute was unusual
in that, as the Court observed, it "neither regulate[d] a commercial activ-
ity nor contain[ed] a requirement that the possession be connected in any
way to interstate commerce." 5 Nor was the statute based on any congres-
sional finding of any effect on interstate commerce by gun possession
near schools.26 Rather, the government argued that "§ 922(q) is valid be-
cause possession of a firearm in a local school zone does indeed substan-
tially affect interstate commerce." 7 This was because possession of guns
leads to violent crime, and violent crime increases insurance costs and
decreases interstate travel . Also, possession of guns in schools
"threaten[s] the learning environment" which leads to a "less productive
citizenry" which "would have an adverse effect on the Nation's economic
well-being." 9
The Court, summarizing its past Commerce Clause cases, held that
permissible federal regulation fell into three categories:
23. There is also much to Professor Jed Rubenfeld's view that the federalism debate is a "mi-
rage." Richard Brust, Reviewing Rehnquist, A.B.A. J., May 2003, at 47. In his view, "[tihe court's real
agenda.., is to reverse the steady march toward antidiscrimination law .... " Id.. Rubenfeld points to
Boy Scouts v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) where the Court, in an anti-federalism decision, struck down a
New Jersey law prohibiting discrimination against gays by the Boy Scouts. But then, last Term, in
Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003), the Court again struck down a state law, this time in favor of
gay rights. And in Nevada Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), it allowed employees to
recover money damages in federal court for a state's failure to comply with the federal Family and
Medical Leave Act. Discerning a consistent direction is unfortunately difficult. Professor Larry 0.
Kramer's observation is that "the Rehnquist court's legacy is less about state sovereignty than it is
about judicial sovereignty, a bid for supremacy over the other two branches, especially Congress."
Brust, supra, at 47. This view has the most evidence to support it, though I doubt that most members
of the Court are explicitly thinking in terms of a "bid for supremacy" as an overarching goal of the
Court. Rather, they are perhaps feeling less deference to what the Court considers erroneous decisions
of the other branches than in the past.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) made it a federal offense "for any individual knowingly to possess a
firearm ... at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone."
25. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,551 (1995).
26. Id. at 562.
27. Id. at 563.
28. Id. at 563-64.
29. Id. at 564.
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First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate com-
merce .... Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in in-
terstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intra-
state activities.... Finally, Congress's commerce authority includes the
power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to inter-
state commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce.
30
Only the third category was potentially applicable in Lopez. As to
this, the Court dismissed the above arguments by the government as to
why possession of a gun in a school zone "substantially affected" com-
merce:
The Government admits, under its "costs of crime" reasoning, that
Congress could regulate not only all violent crime, but all activities that
might lead to violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to
interstate commerce .... Similarly, under the Government's "national
productivity" reasoning, Congress could regulate any activity that it
found was related to the economic productivity of individual citizens:
family law (including marriage, divorce, and child custody), for exam-
ple. Under the theories that the Government presents in support of
§ 922(q), it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even
in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where States
historically have been sovereign.'
The Court concluded that "[tihe possession of a gun in a local school
zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition
elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce."32 The
Court distinguished the New Deal case of Wickard v. Filbun,33 in which
the Court upheld penalties against a farmer who violated wheat quotas
by growing wheat for his own private consumption on the ground that,
though his own effect on commerce was slight, wheat growing was never-
theless a commercial activity which was subject to congressional regula-
tion since the aggregate effect of many wheat growers on interstate
commerce was substantial.34 Gun possession, by contrast, was not a
"commercial activity" and could not be aggregated to try to show a sub-
stantial impact on commerce. 
35
30. Id. at 558-59 (citations omitted).
3I. Id. at 564 (citation omitted).
32. Id. at 567.
33. 317 U.S. iii 0942).
34. "[W]here a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de mini-
mis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence." Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 558 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 n.27 (1968)).
35. "Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate numerous commercial ac-
tivities... [but t]hat authority, though broad, does not include the authority to regulate each and
every aspect of local schools." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565-66. The Court uses the terms "economic" and
"commercial" interchangeably, though, as Professor Ides has pointed out, they can have rather differ-
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Under the narrowest reading of Lopez, the defect in the statute, as
36.the Court recognized at the very beginning of its opinion, is that neither
the statute, nor congressional findings, make any reference to interstate
commerce. Under this reading, adopted by many courts of appeals,37 Lo-
pez could be satisfied if Congress added some reference to interstate
commerce to the statute or at least made findings as to the prohibited ac-
tivity's effect on commerce, as it did in the loan-sharking statute ap-
proved in United States v. Perez.38
This narrow reading, however, is not consistent with the thrust of the
Court's reasoning. Lopez refers on several occasions to a "substantial ef-
fect" on interstate commerce.39 Thus Lopez, and even more clearly Mor-
rison, requires not just lip service in the statute, but rather an
independent finding by the courts that the activity in question in fact sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce, regardless of the statutory lan-
guage or congressional findings.4'
It is also apparently not enough that, at some uncertain time in the
past, a gun or other instrumentality of the crime may have moved in in-
terstate commerce. Since almost everything, or some of its components,
has moved in interstate commerce at some point, mere past movement in
interstate commerce, unconnected to the instant crime, would not seem to
satisfy the "non-infinity" principle that Lopez was announcing: "[I]f we
were to accept the Government's arguments, we are hard pressed to
posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to
regulate."4
Another issue raised, but not answered by Lopez, is whether the
connection to commerce depends on the nature of the crime or the vic-
tim. Is arson of a store sufficient to fall within federal jurisdiction be-
cause the store was engaged in commerce, some of which was inevitably
interstate? Or must the crime itself, as Lopez seemed to suggest, be
"commercial." And what of other crimes that might seem more clearly
ent meanings. Allen Ides, Economic Activity as a Proxy for Federalism: Intuition and Reason in United
States v. Morrison, i8 CONST. COMMENT. 563,574--80 (2001). See also infra text accompanying note 65.
36. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
37. See, e.g., cases concerning the firearms statutes cited infra note i68.
38. 402 U.S. 146 (1971). As I noted long ago, "Congress' conclusion that loan-sharking affects
interstate commerce is highly questionable in many cases." Craig M. Bradley, Racketeering and the
Federalization of Crime, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 213, 252-53 (1984). For an insightful discussion into
possible readings of Lopez, see Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of
Lopez, Or What If the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?, 2000 Wis.
L. REV. 369 (2000).
39. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556.
40. Id. at 563 ("[C]ongressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that
the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce ... .
41. Id. at 564.
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"economic" than gun possession, but would not be considered "commer-
cial," such as robbery, extortion and theft? As I will discuss, Jones sug-
gests answers to these questions.
It is clear that Lopez itself in no sense struck a "death blow" to fed-
eral criminal law enforcement. It involved a statute that was marginal to
the federal law enforcement effort, and the Court declined to adopt the
view of Justice Thomas's concurring opinion that federal jurisdiction
should be limited only to the first two categories set forth in the majority
opinion and should not apply to activity that substantially affects com-
merce.42 Recognizing that the substantial effects test, if taken to its logical
extreme, would give Congress a "police power" over all aspects of
American life, he urged that it be "reconsider[ed] ... with an eye toward
constructing a standard that reflects the text and history of the Com-
merce Clause without totally rejecting [the Court's] more recent Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence." 3 He did not explain what this test might
be.
No other Justice joined in this dubious suggestion and two other
members of the five-Justice majority, Kennedy and O'Connor, joined in
a concurrence that made it clear that they were not signing on to a major
retrenchment of federal jurisdiction but only to a "necessary though lim-
ited holding."' Kennedy further emphasized the importance of stare
decisis in preserving the "stability of our Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence.. . ."" But Justice Thomas was right! As long as the "substantial
effects" test remains on the books, federal criminal jurisdiction, even if
somewhat constrained, will continue to be broad. Unlike Justice Thomas,
I support this.
B. UNITED STATES V. MORRISON
Morrison answered some of the questions raised by Lopez while in-
evitably raising at least as many new questions as it answered. 46 This
much can be said of Morrison with some certainty: It, like Lopez, did not
of its own force, contrary to the commentators quoted at the beginning of
this Article, command a major retrenchment of federal criminal law.
While it certainly paved the way to further significant limitations on fed-
eral power, its actual holding did not greatly reduce that power. Indeed,
42. Id. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 584-85 (Thomas, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 568 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
45. ld. at 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
46. See Craig M. Bradley, The Uncertainty Principle in the Supreme Court, 1986 DuKE L.J. I, 2
(1986) (arguing that it is in the nature of Supreme Court decisions to raise more questions than they
answer).
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when read in tandem with Jones," its immediate impact would seem to
be rather narrow but still meaningful.
The Morrison case began with the rape of a female student (Brzon-
kala) at Virginia Polytechnic Institute (VPI) by two fellow students
(Morrison and Crawford). Dissatisfied with the university's failure to
punish her assailants, Brzonkala brought suit in federal district court un-
der the Violence Against Women Act. After Morrison moved to dismiss
on the ground that the statute was unconstitutional, the United States in-
tervened to defend the statute.
The statute provides that a "person.. . who commits a crime of vio-
lence motivated by gender" is subject to suit under the statute.48 Like the
statute in Lopez, it contains no reference to interstate commerce. Unlike
the Lopez statute, however, it was based on extensive congressional find-
ings as to how violence against women affects interstate commerce.49 In
this respect, it resembles the statutes that the Court upheld in Perez5" and
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States.5
The Court, in striking down the statute as exceeding Congress's
powers under either the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment, held that these findings were insufficient. "[S]imply
because Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially af-
fects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so.'"2 Thus the
narrowest reading of Lopez, that it simply required a finding by Con-
gress, was put to rest.
The Court criticized the findings because the effect of violence
against women on interstate commerce was, like gun possession in a
school zone, too attenuated:
[Tihe concern that we expressed in Lopez that Congress might use the
Commerce Clause to completely obliterate the Constitution's distinc-
tion between national and local authority seems well founded.... If
accepted, petitioner's reasoning would allow Congress to regulate any
crime as long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime has
substantial effects on employment, production, transit or consumption.
Indeed, if Congress may regulate gender-motivated violence, it would
be able to regulate murder or any other type of violence ....
Petitioners' reasoning, moreover, will not limit Congress to regulat-
ing violence but may... be applied equally as well to family law and
other areas of traditional state regulation since the aggregate effect of
47. See discussion infra Part II.C.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1398i(c) (zooo).
49. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000).
50. 402 U.S. 146; see supra note 38 and accompanying text.
51. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
52. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 n.2 (i995)).
[Vol. 55:573
FEDERALISM AND CRIMINAL LAW
marriage, divorce, and childrearing on the national economy is un-
doubtedly significant."s
Thus, the Court reiterated the non-infinity principle as a constitu-
tional limit on Congress's authority, not just a principle of statutory in-
terpretation. 4 What, then, is the scope of allowable federal action?
The Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national
and what is truly local.... The regulation and punishment of intrastate
violence that is not directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods
involved in interstate commerce has always been the province of the
States.5
I doubt that a consistent "distinction between what is truly national
and truly local" can be drawn and believe that this is no more likely to
produce a coherent doctrine than then-Associate Justice Rehnquist's at-
tempt to distinguish "traditional [state] governmental functions" from
non-traditional ones in National League of Cities v. Usery.6 Nevertheless,
this statement provides an important insight into the Court's priorities:
The Court will look more benignly upon congressional attempts to regu-
late matters that the states cannot, will not, or are ineffective in, regulat-
ing. The majority did not consider violence against women to be such a
matter.
A firm requirement that federal crimes based on the Commerce
Clause must be limited to those "directed at the instrumentalities, chan-
nels or goods involved in interstate commerce," as the Court stated in
Morrison, would be a dramatic limitation on federal power and would
seem to wipe out the third Lopez category of "substantially affecting
commerce" as a basis of federal authority. But Morrison goes on to make
it clear that acts that "substantially affect commerce" are still subject to
federal jurisdiction.57 A "substantial effect," however, can only be shown
by aggregating "economic activity.,
58
In elaborating on why the Gun Free School Zones Act had been
found deficient in Lopez, the Court provided guidance for determining
when such a substantial effect may be found. As summarized by the
Ninth Circuit, these include:
53. Id. at 615-16 (citation omitted).
54. It therefore seems clear that the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1999, prohibiting violence
motivated by the "race, color, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, gender or disability" of the
victim and based on findings that "such violence affects interstate commerce in many ways" will not
pass muster after Morrison. 145 CONG. REC. S9o38 (daily ed. July 22, 1999).
55. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18 (citation omitted).
56. 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976). This effort was abandoned by the Court nine years later in Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
57. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609.
58. Id. at 613 (emphasis added).
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i) whether the statute in question regulates commerce "or any sort of
economic enterprise"; 2) whether the statute contains any "express ju-
risdictional element which might limit its reach to a discrete set" of
cases; 3) whether the statute or its legislative history contains "express
congressional findings" that the regulated activity affects interstate
commerce; and 4) whether the link between the regulated activity and
a substantial effect on interstate commerce is "attenuated."59
This seems to suggest that, for example, the Hobbs Act, with its ref-
erence to "whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects
commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce,
by robbery or extortion" is guilty," would pass muster since "the design
of the statute has an evident commercial nexus," as Morrison required.6
Likewise, statutes that forbade the sale or shipping of a gun in interstate
commerce to certain people, the arson of a building used in commerce,
or loansharking (a commercial activity that Congress says has an inter-
state effect) would all likely pass the Morrison/Lopez test.6 ' Thus, while
congressional findings alone are not enough, findings regarding a crime
that had a more obvious impact on commerce would suffice. Likewise, a
statute that actually requires the government to prove a substantial effect
on commerce would be adequate. On the other hand, the mere presence
of a "jurisdictional hook," i.e., some reference to interstate commerce in
the statute, is just one of four criteria to be considered and is neither
necessary, if the appropriate effect on commerce can otherwise be estab-
lished, nor sufficient, if the effect cannot be shown.
What about a Hobbs Act prosecution for a bribe given to a judge b'
a lawyer so his client receives a suspended sentence in a criminal case?
A bribe is "economic," and perhaps even "commercial," in that it in-
volves a consensual exchange of money for services in the course of the
parties' business. On the other hand, the effect of this bribe on interstate
commerce is attenuated at best. But if the bribe is considered a "com-
mercial activity," Morrison approved "aggregating its effects" to show an
effect on commerce.6' This could easily be done since, if judges routinely
took bribes to fix cases rather than deciding them on the merits, the chill-
ing effect on commercial transactions would be significant. We do not yet
59. United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) (summarizing Morrison, 529 U.S.
at 610-12).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 195i(a) (2000).
61. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611.
62. In Lopez, the Court cited Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), which upheld the loan-
sharking statute, as an example of Congress's regulation of "activity that 'exerts a substantial economic
effect on interstate commerce."' 514 U.S. at 557 (quoting Wickward v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 11s, 125
(1942)).
63. See United States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553,555-56 (7 th Cir. 1995).
64. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
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know, however, how much the Court is willing to extend the concept of
"commercial."
This is one of a number of questions that can be raised about one of
the statutes affected by Morrison and Lopez. There are many others. In-
deed, Professor Allan Ides has ably demonstrated that Morrison's pro-
nouncements as to the scope of federal jurisdiction may be read as so
vague as to amount to little more than "I know it when I see it."65 How-
ever, I come not to bury Morrison but to understand it. Obviously the
majority had some sense of what the limits of Congress's power to de-
clare criminal laws under the Commerce Clause must be, even if it did
not express them clearly. We can find some clues as to what the Court's
position may be by considering further Supreme Court cases.
C. JONES V. UNITED STATES
Unlike the hotly contested holdings in Lopez and Morrison, Jones
was a brief, unanimous decision construing a federal statute narrowly.
This construction, however, was to avoid "grave and doubtful constitu-
tional questions" had the conviction been upheld.66 Jones tells us much
about the Court's direction when read in conjunction with the other two
cases.
In this case, the defendant was convicted under the federal arson
statute for throwing a Molotov cocktail into the home of his cousin in
Indiana.6 The federal arson statute provides that it is a crime to damage
or destroy "by means of fire or an explosive, any ... property used in in-
terstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting.., commerce."68
In contradistinction to the statutes in Lopez and Morrison, this one
contains a direct reference to interstate commerce. Moreover, the gov-
ernment could show a much stronger connection to interstate commerce
than in the earlier cases: the mortgage was held by an out-of-state lender,
the home was insured by an out-of-state insurance company, and the
home used natural gas from out of state. Thus, the statute required, and
the government proved, effects on interstate commerce by the home's
destruction. Surely, nervous federal prosecutors must have said to them-
selves, if the Court did not intend to gut federal criminal jurisdiction, this
statute would pass muster.
69
65. Ides, supra note 35, at 574.
66. Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 857 (2000).
67. Id. at 850.
68. I8 U.S.C. § 844(i) (20oo).
69. Indeed the Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Easterbrook, agreed with the government
without dissent. United States v. Jones, 178 F.3d 479, 481 (7th Cir. 1999).
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"Not good enough," held the Court. The statute requires that the
building be "used" in interstate commerce. The Court stated that, "The
key word is 'used.' 7. (It is?) "The proper inquiry. . . 'is into the function
of the building itself, and then a determination of whether that function
affects interstate commerce."' 7 ' The Court then concluded that "used"
means "active employment for commercial purposes, and not merely a
passive, passing, or past connection to commerce."72 Since it is "not the
common perception that a private, owner occupied residence is 'used' in
the 'activity' of receiving natural gas, a mortgage or an insurance pol-
icy ' 73 it followed that this home did not qualify under the statute ipso
facto. Moreover, "[w]ere [the Court] to adopt the Government's expan-
sive interpretation of § 844 (i) hardly a building in the land would fall out-
side the federal statute's domain. 74
The discussion so far would be greeted with great enthusiasm by
proponents of a limited federal role since Jones went a step further than
Morrison in reversing a conviction under a statute that actually contained
an "affecting commerce" element and as to which the government could
make at least a colorable argument that interstate commerce was af-
fected, albeit as a matter of statutory construction.
But, the Court explicitly reaffirmed its prior holding in Russell v.
United States which held that § 844 (i) did apply to the burning of a two-
unit apartment building because, as a rental property, it was "'being used
in an activity affecting commerce . . . . ,,,7' Even though the connection to
interstate commerce was precisely the same in both Russell and Jones
(natural gas, insurance, etc.) and even though the rental property was
"used in the activity of receiving natural gas" in precisely the same way
that a private home is "used" in that activity, the fact that the property
burned in Russell was a commercial property rather than a private home
was sufficient to support the conviction in Russell.
Thus, Jones apparently stands for one of two propositions: First, if
the victim of the crime is a commercial entity, no particular effect on in-
terstate commerce need be shown because victimizing a commercial en-
tity inevitably affects interstate commerce. 76 Alternatively, by continuing
70. Jones, 529 U.S. at 854.
71. Id. (citations omitted).
72. Id. at 855.
73. Id. at 856.
74. Id. at 857.
75. Id. at 853, affg Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858 (1985).
76. The Jones Court noted that the mere fact that the building was rented in Russell established
that it "was... being used in an activity affecting commerce" without any reference to interstate
commerce. Id. (citation omitted). Jones further observed that nearly every "building in the land" is
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to authorize prosecutions for burning local rental property, Jones may
have been saying that once it is determined that the victim is commercial,
the effect on interstate commerce is achieved by aggregating the effect of
all such intrastate burnings as in Wickard v. Filburn.77 In any case, once
the victim is commercial, the connection to interstate commerce is a
foregone conclusion.
There is more to Jones, though. What if Congress, "to make clear
[its] intent to reach the arson of private dwellings" amends the arson
statute, leaving out the word "used," and simply forbids the "destruction
of any property by fire or explosive device, which destruction affects in-
terstate or foreign commerce"? Would it now be constitutionally permis-
sible to prosecute for arson of a private home? I think not. Jones, of
course, avoided this question by focusing on the word "used," but this
hypothetical statute raises the "grave and doubtful" constitutional issue
that Jones avoided.
Were such a prosecution allowed under the hypothetical statute,
"hardly a building in the land would fall outside the federal statute's do-
main," as in Jones, because it "is constructed with supplies that have
moved in interstate commerce, served by utilities that have an interstate
connection, [etc.]""7 Similarly, as Morrison made clear, this non-infinity
principle is a constitutional "limitation of congressional authority, not
solely a matter of legislative grace."79 Thus Jones and Morrison combined
stand for the principle that it is not enough that a statute says "affecting
commerce." Rather, as Morrison holds, commerce must in fact be "sub-
stantially affect[ed]." ' Jones, by holding that a private home is not
"used" in commerce also precluded a holding that the burning of a pri-
vate home substantially affects commerce because private, non-
commercial activity cannot be aggregated and the burning of a single
home will not have a substantial effect. Thus, Jones provides the key that
unlocks Morrison's message for federal criminal law.
What if the homeowner in Jones had burned his own home to collect
the insurance proceeds? What if a home is burned in connection with an
extortionate demand for protection payments rather than because of an
connected to interstate commerce because it "is constructed with supplies that have moved in inter-
state commerce, served by utilities that have an interstate connection," etc. Id. at 857.
77. This is supported by a Wickard-type argument used in Russell: "[Tlhe local rental of an
apartment unit is merely an element of a much broader commercial market in rental properties. The
congressional power to regulate the class of activities that constitute the rental market for real estate
includes the power to regulate individual activity within that class." 471 U.S. at 862.
78. Jones, 529 U.S. at 857. To be sure, Jones used this language to suggest that Congress did not
intend the statute to be this broad.
79. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 (2000).
8o. Id. at 609.
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apparent personal grudge? Jones quoted Justice Kennedy's statement in
Lopez that "neither the actors nor their conduct has a commercial char-
acter." 8' Thus, a possible reading of these cases is that, as long as the
crime is economically motivated, unlike gun possession, rape, or (non-
profit) arson, it falls within the federal ambit. However, as I argue below,
I do not believe that the Court intended the Lopez limitation to be so
narrow. That is, arson for profit, robbery, etc., though arguably "eco-
nomic" in nature, are not "commercial," as Lopez and Morrison re-
quired.s2 We must focus on the business of either the actor or the victim.
If the actor is in the "business" of committing arson, then it is fair to
deem his crime "commercial" and within federal jurisdiction. Otherwise,
as Jones and Morrison make clear, the focus must be on whether the vic-
tim is commercial. Crimes aimed at private individuals or private prop-
erty do not ordinarily qualify for federal jurisdiction.8
A final note about Jones: A separate concurrence by Justice Stevens,
joined by Justice Thomas, which emphasized that the Court "should nar-
rowly interpret federal criminal laws that overlap with state authority
unless congressional intent to assert its jurisdiction is plain,"84 shows that
concern about overly expansive federal jurisdiction is not limited to the
Court's right wing. Where Justices Stevens and Thomas part company is
on whether to strike down statutes where congressional intent is clear.8 '
Given Morrison and Lopez, I think that a majority of the Court would
strike down my hypothetical post-Jones arson statute.
D. OTHER SUPREME COURT CASES
In Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc. (NOW 11)86
decided in 2003, the Supreme Court dealt with the meaning of the Hobbs
Act in the context of a civil RICO suit brought by the National Organiza-
tion of Women (N.O.W.) against Operation Rescue and other anti-
8i. Jones, 529 U.S. at 858 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580(1995)).
82. "First, we observed that § 922(q) was 'a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do
with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise .... ' Morrison, 529 U.S. at 61o (quoting Lopez,
514 U.S. at 561). Prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 844(d) would, however, be possible if the explosive
had been "received" in interstate commerce.
83. See infra note 131 and accompanying text. Another issue raised by Jones is whether arson of a
church can now be prosecuted under § 844(i). In United States v. Rayborn, the court, reflecting the
view of other courts of appeals, held that it could, considering a church to be functioning as a "busi-
ness" for the purposes of the statute. 312 F.3d 229, 233-34 (6th Cir. 2002). This seems correct.
84. Jones, 529 U.S. at 860 (Stevens, J., concurring).
85. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 656 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, J.).
86. 537 U.S. 393 (2003). This case followed National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler
(NOW 1), 510 U.S. 249 (1994), in which a unanimous Court, one year before Lopez, interpreted RICO
broadly, concluding that "RICO does not require proof that either the racketeering enterprise or the
predicate acts of racketeering activity were motivated by an economic purpose." NOW II, 537 U.S. at
398-99 (quoting NOWI, 510 U.S. at 256-62).
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abortion protestors. N.O.W. claimed that the protestors had committed a
pattern of Hobbs Act violations by committing various acts of violence
against clinics in an effort to drive them out of business. The issue was
whether such behavior constituted "extortion" which the Hobbs Act de-
fines as "the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, in-
duced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force... ."8' The Court, by
an eight-to-one vote, held, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, that
the Hobbs Act means what it says: the defendants must actually obtain
or attempt to obtains property. It is not enough that they sought to drive
the victims out of business. That is the crime of criminal coercion not ex-
tortion.
89
The government as amicus curiae9 and Justice Stevens, the sole dis-
senter, 9' were concerned that the Court's decision would prevent the
government from prosecuting not only violent anti-abortion protesters
but also organized criminals who attempted to drive competitors out of
business in order to take over all of the business for themselves, as in
United States v. Tropiano,92 where mobsters tried to drive away compet-
ing trash haulers. But the Court responded that
the dissent is mistaken to suggest that our decision reaches, much less
rejects, lower court decisions such as United States v. Tropiano... in
which the Second Circuit concluded that the intangible right to solicit
refuse collection accounts "constituted property within the Hobbs Act
definition."93
In other words, the right to do business is an intangible property
right that can be the subject of extortion. But in NOW II, unlike the
situation in Tropiano, the defendants' ultimate goal was not to "obtain"
that property. The protestors did not want to take over the abortion clin-
ics; they wanted to drive them out of business. Thus, as in Jones, al-
though the Court construed a federal statute narrowly, and contrary to
the way the Justice Department wanted it construed, it carefully avoided
interfering with the government's ability to use the statute to prosecute
one of its core concerns: in this case, organized crime.
87. I8 U.S.C. § 195I(b)(2) (2000).
88. The Hobbs Act also is violated by attempts. Id. § 1951(a).
89. NOW 11, 537 U.S. at 405.
9o. Brief of Amicus Curiae United States at 16, NOW , 537 U.S. 393 (2003) (No. 92-780).
91. NOW 11, 537 U.S. at 412. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92. 418 F.2d i069 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1021 (1970).
93. NOW 11, 537 U.S. at 402 n.6 (citations omitted).
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The Court had made a similar ruling in the 1987 case of Carpenter v.
United States in construing the federal mail fraud statute. 4 Since this stat-
ute is based on the postal, rather than commerce, power, this case is only
indirectly relevant. However, it shows both the Court's tendency to read
federal statutes narrowly and its care not to interfere with the federal
government's core prosecutorial interests.
In McNally v. United States,95 decided in the Term prior to Carpenter,
the Court had held that the word "fraud" in the mail fraud statute re-
quired the defendant to deprive the victim of property, namely "the dep-
rivation of something of value by trick, deceit, chicane or
overreaching. ' 6 Thus, depriving the citizens of Kentucky of the "intangi-
ble right to good government" by an insurance kickback scheme, which
did not violate Kentucky law or deprive the state of any revenue, did not
violate the mail fraud statute. Similar to Morrison, McNally was de-
scribed as "one of the most devastating blows to the Justice Department
in years," by one Washington attorney.' Congressman Conyers called it
"a crippling blow" and introduced legislation to override it.9
In Carpenter, however, the Court made it clear that property in-
cluded intangible property, including a business's "right to exclusive use"
of confidential business information." Thus, the government's ability to
prosecute frauds whose goal was depriving victims of intangible property,
such as information, business reputation, etc., could still be prosecuted
despite the McNally "property" limitation. Even if Congress had not
acted, the effect of McNally would have been limited to the laudable goal
of forcing federal prosecutors to think more clearly about who was de-
frauded out of what, rather than basing prosecutions on such ephemeral
theories as the intangible right to honest services, to good government or
the like.'"
Another case that bears on where the Court may be going in limiting
the federal government's power to prosecute various crimes is United
94. 484 U.S. 19, 25-28. The mail fraud statute, I8 U.S.C. § 1341 (2ooo), provides that "[w]hoever,
having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or
property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises ... by mail" is guilty.
95- 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
96. Id. at 358 (quoting Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, I88 (1924)).
97. Craig M. Bradley, Foreword: Mail Fraud After McNally and Carpenter: The Essence of Fraud,
79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 573, 574 (1988).
98. Id. A new statute, i8 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000), was enacted providing that it is a violation of
§ 1341 to "deprive another of the intangible right of honest services." See also id. at 618-20.
99. 484 U.S. at 26.
Ioo. Bradley, supra note 97 at 593-95. Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. likewise was a strong critic of
the "intangible rights" approach. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Metastasis of Mail Fraud: The Continu-
ing Story of the "Evolution" of a White-Collar Crime, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. i (1983).
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States v. Robertson,'"' decided five days after Lopez in 1995. In Robertson
the issue was whether a defendant who invested narcotics proceeds into a
gold mine violated RICO.' °2 The RICO statute provides that it is a viola-
tion to invest the proceeds of specified unlawful activity in the "acquisi-
tion of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any
enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate
or foreign commerce.""''7 It was established that the defendant purchased
equipment out of state, hired out-of-state employees, paid for them to
travel to Alaska, and transported some of the gold out of state.' 4 The
Court held that it did not have to decide whether the "activities
met... (or would have to meet), the requirement of substantially affect-
ing interstate commerce . ... "" Instead, the Court concluded that the
defendants
assuredly brought the gold mine within § 1962(a)'s alternative criterion
of "any enterprise.., engaged in... interstate or foreign commerce."
As we said in American Building Maintenance, a corporation is gener-
ally "engaged in commerce" when it is itself "directly engaged in the
production, distribution, or acquisition of goods or services in inter-
state commerce."' 6
Thus, as long as the actor is engaged in commerce (i.e., actual com-
merce, not just a crime that seeks money) then the government need not
prove that the crime affected commerce. Because of the non-infinity
principle, it would not be enough to establish federal jurisdiction to show
that a robber, for example, used a gun that had traveled in interstate
commerce. But it may be enough, based on Robertson, to show that a
criminal syndicate engaged in a series of robberies, car thefts, kidnap-
pings, etc., as a business.
Another important case construing a federal criminal statute to give
the federal government continuing ability to vindicate its key concerns is
Evans v. United States."7 Evans was a Hobbs Act prosecution of a county
commissioner for accepting a bribe in a zoning matter."'8 Although the
Hobbs Act does not prohibit bribery by its terms, the Court held that the
statute's prohibition of "extortion under color of official right" included
bribery."'9 A majority reached this conclusion, just three years before
1OI. 514 U.S. 669 (1995) (per curiam).
102. Id. at 67o-71.
103. i8 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2000).
lo4- Robertson, 514 U.S. at 670-71.
105. Id. at 671.
lO6. Id. at 671-72 (citation omitted).
107. 504 U.S. 255 (1992).
iS. Id. at 257-58.
1O9. Id. at 268 n.I8.
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Lopez, despite Justice Thomas's argument in dissent that "concerns of
federalism require us to give a narrow construction to federal legislation
in such sensitive areas" (i.e., "[the] conduct of state governmental offi-
cials"). " Obviously, the majority agreed with the government that
prosecution of local officials for bribery is an important federal concern
despite the fact that the statute does not proscribe bribery by its terms
and despite the federalism issues raised by Justice Thomas.
E. WHERE THE COURT Is GOING
The strong sense conveyed by the recent Supreme Court pro-
nouncements in federal criminal law is that the Court is not interested in
making severe cutbacks in federal criminal authority. Under many fed-
eral statutes, the connection to interstate commerce is much more direct
and obvious than the statutes at issue in Lopez and Morrison. Even when
it is not, however, as in the Hobbs Act prosecution for bribery of a local
official in Evans,"' the Court has been willing to accept a broad reading
of federal statutes when necessary to further significant federal concerns.
Also, in cases like NOW H... and McNally and Carpenter,"3 where the
Court read a statute narrowly, it was careful to ensure the statute's
"'core" uses were not impeded.
What the Court is trying to do, at least in part, is to stem the tide of
what it regards as unnecessary federal legislation which is overburdening
the federal courts. As Professor Deborah Jones Merritt pointed out in
1995 after Lopez:
Since i98o, the annual number of federal criminal cases has expanded
by more than fifty percent. Criminal cases now account for almost one-
half of all federal trials, and, in some districts, criminal trials swamp
civil ones.
... In 199 o, a Federal Courts Study Committee cautioned that "the
long-term health of the federal judicial system require[s] returning the
federal courts to their proper, limited role in dealing with crime.""
The Supreme Court Justices each head a circuit and meet annually
with the district and appellate court judges. As one of those judges re-
ports:
At every meeting of federal judges that I attend there is the complaint
that the Congress is broadening federal jurisdiction to the point where
IIo. Id. at 291 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
I. See supra text accompanying note 107.
112. See supra text accompanying note 86.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 94-oo.
114. Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 707-08 (i995) (citations omitted).
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we are unable to do our jobs. The historically unique and discrete ju-
risdiction of the Federal Courts is being distorted. The constant lament
is that the constitutional concept of Federalism is being eviscerated by
the Congress. "
This is not to say the Supreme Court's primary concern is the dissat-
isfaction of federal judges about being overburdened. Rather it is that
the Supreme Court agrees with its fellow federal judges that Congress
has a tendency to claim to solve social problems by creating new crimes,
without much thought about the consequent overburdening of the fed-
eral courts. A majority of the Court no doubt considered the Gun Free
School Zones Act and the Violence Against Women Act to be just such
unnecessary legislation, passed by Democratic Congresses to mollify lib-
eral interest groups-but unlikely to have any significant effect on gun
possession in schools, violence against women, or commerce.
However, a significant portion of the problem lies not with Congress
but with the Justice Department. Departmental guidelines state that
Hobbs Act robbery provisions, for example, are "to be utilized only in
instances involving organized crime, gang activity or wide-ranging
schemes.." Yet it is obviously employed much more broadly than that.
Similarly, the brief for the government in Jones contains no discussion of
why the federal government needs to prosecute a routine arson of a
home case. Rather, its argument is basically: "We want to because we
can."
Finally, as the cases interpreting a series of federal statutes discussed
below illustrate, the fault for the overburdening of the federal courts lies,
not just with Congress and the executive branch, but with the courts
themselves, which have largely ignored the implications of Lopez, Morri-
son, and Jones and have construed federal statues more broadly than
those cases suggest that they should.
II. THE STATUTES
While on their faces, and in the view of the commentators, Lopez,
Morrison, and Jones seemed to raise serious questions about the consti-
tutionality of many federal statutes, few convictions have been reversed
based on these cases. Two of the four key statutes mentioned at the be-
ginning of this Article are not affected at all. The mail fraud statute is
based on Congress's power over the mails, not the commerce power.
I15. United States v. Cortner, 834 F. Supp. 242, 244 (M.D. Tenn. 1993), rev'd sub nom. United
States v. Osteen, 30 F.3d 135 (6th Cir. 1994). Likewise, Professor Kathleen Brickey reports that in
Chief Justice Rehnquist's "year-end reports to the judiciary, he has warned that the federal courts are
limited resources and that unchecked growth of federal criminal law threatens to create a crisis in the
federal justice system." Brickey, supra note 21, at 840.
116. U.S. AT'Ys MANUAL § 9-131.040 (Apr. 1999).
February 2004]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
And the Travel Act, which requires "travel in or use of a facility" in in-
terstate or foreign commerce clearly falls under one of the first two Lo-
pez criteria." 7 By contrast, both the Hobbs Act and RICO use the
"affecting interstate commerce" language which is problematic under
Lopez and Morrison unless the effect is "substantial." This Part discusses
these and other federal criminal statutes.
A. THE HOBBS ACT
The Hobbs Act provides that "whoever in any way or degree ob-
structs, delays, or affects commerce.., by robbery or extortion" is
guilty."8 A leading, and typical, court of appeals case on the constitution-
ality of the Hobbs Act after Lopez is United States v. Bolton."9 The de-
fendant, Bolton, committed a series of robberies of businesses in
Wichita, Kansas. 2 ' The court noted that each of the businesses was de-
prived of money that would have been used to purchase supplies in inter-
state commerce. 2' The court further pointed out the well established rule
that, since the Hobbs Act applies to conduct that "in any way or de-
gree ... affects commerce" even a de minimis effect on commerce is suf-
ficient to satisfy its terms.'22
The court then summarized the holding of Lopez:
Lopez did not ... require the government to show that individual in-
stances of a the regulated activity substantially affect commerce ....
Rather, the Court recognized that if a statute regulates an activity
which, through repetition, in aggregate has a substantial effect on in-
terstate commerce... "the de minimis character of individual instances
arising under that statute is of no consequence."
•.. Unlike possession of a firearm in a school zone ... robbery and
extortion are activities that through repetition can substantially affect
interstate commerce.'23
Bolton is largely correct, and has been widely relied upon by other
courts of appeals, in finding that robberies that deplete the assets of
businesses not only satisfy the Hobbs Act's "affecting commerce" re-
quirement but also satisfy Lopez.'24 In other words, a de minimis effect
T17. In fact, in Morrison, the Court cited another provision of the Violence Against Women Act
with approval, i8 U.S.C. § 2261(a)(i), which, similarly to the Travel Act, punishes violence during or
as a result of interstate travel. 529 U.S. at 613-14 n.5.
II8. I8 U.S.C. § 1951 (2oo0).
1I9. 68 F.3d 3 9 6 (ioth Cir. 1995).
120. Id. at 397.
121. Id. at 399.
122. Id. at 398.
123. Id. at 399 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,558 (i995)) (citations omitted).
124. See, e.g., United States v. Cordero, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 31039, at *12 (4th Cir. Dec. io,
1998); United States v. Robinson, II9 F.3 d 1205, 1212 (5th Cir. 1997).
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on commerce is still sufficient after Lopez as long as a commercial entity
is the victim, because such robberies can be aggregated to show an effect
on commerce.
2 5
However, Bolton also held that robbery of a private individual was
sufficient to violate the Hobbs Act, 126 a position taken by other courts of
appeals as well."7 Robbery of a private individual, though, like arson of a
private home, cannot be aggregated to show a substantial effect on com-
merce. Consequently, unless a defendant has committed a robbery or se-
ries of robberies that are of sufficient magnitude that they have a
substantial effect on commerce themselves, the Hobbs Act has not been
violated.
Some courts of appeals have recognized this. In United States v.
Wang,"' for example, the defendant robbed a group of people in a pri-
vate residence of $4200, of which $1200 belonged to a restaurant that did
business in interstate commerce.'29 The court found that robbery of pri-
vate individuals did not fall under the Hobbs Act and that "there [was]
no proof that [the victims] closed the restaurant, that they were unable to
order goods from out of state. There [was] no evidence of an effect upon
interstate commerce."'3 Indeed, as I argued above, even if the robbery of
the individual could have been shown to have some effect on interstate
commerce, that would not be enough to satisfy the "substantiality" re-
quirement.
As Wang notes, this decision is simply one of a number of pre- and
post-Lopez decisions that have held that robbery (or extortion) of a pri-
vate individual that has only a "speculative, indirect effect on a business
engaged in interstate commerce" is not enough to violate the Hobbs
Act. '3 Otherwise, the Sixth Circuit agrees with the unanimous view of
the other circuits that "the Hobbs Act's de minimis standard survives
Lopez."''
125. This was made clear in Lopez: "[Wihere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial rela-
tion to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no
consequence." 514 U.S. at 558 (citations omitted).
126. Bolton, 68 F.3d at 400 n.3. While the property taken in Bolton was a credit card, the court did
not base its holding on the unique attributes of a credit card vis-d-vis commerce.
127. E.g., United States v. Taylor, 176 F.3d 331, 339 (6th Cir. 1999).
128. 222 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2000).
129. Id at 240.
130. Id. at 237 (quoting a finding of the district court).
131. Id. at 238. Accord, United States v. Perrotta, 313 F.3d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 2002) (arguing that Jones
supports this view); United States v. Lynch, 282 F.3d lO49, 1052-55 (9 th Cir. 2001).
132. Wang, 222 F.3d at 239.
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There is a narrower view of Lopez's scope held by exactly half of the
Fifth Circuit, en banc.'33 The en banc court's failure to overrule the panel
judges' decision to sustain the defendant's conviction keeps the Fifth Cir-
cuit, just barely, in the fold with the other circuits in finding that Lopez
did not substantially diminish the Hobbs Act. Since the Fifth Circuit dis-
sent is the only dissenting view from the consensus in the courts of ap-
peals, I consider it at length.
The dissenting opinion, authored by Judge Higginbotham, focuses
on the "commercial activity" language of Lopez. In Hickman, the defen-
dants had robbed a series of chain stores and restaurants in Beaumont,
Texas, with total losses of about $8ooo.' 34 The dissent noted that "the
Hobbs Act is not a regulation of any relevant interstate economic market
(unlike the wheat market regulations in Wickard v. Filburn'35) nor are
there other rational connections among nationwide robberies that would
entitle Congress to make federal crimes of them all.'
' 6
The dissent continued: Since robbery is not "economic activity, ''1. it
follows that robberies cannot be aggregated to achieve the "substantial
effect on interstate commerce" required by Lopez, and therefore only
robberies by, for example, "an organized crime group.., that together
substantially affected commerce" would be covered by the Hobbs Act. I""
If one could aggregate robberies under the Hobbs Act to satisfy the
constitutional demand of a substantial effect on interstate commerce,
there would be no reason one could not aggregate murders, or other
felonies to sustain general federal jurisdiction over all
crimes.... Without some judicially enforceable outer limits to the ag-
gregation theory, "it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal
power, even in areas such as law enforcement.., where States histori-
cally have been sovereign. '
Certainly the position taken by the Hickman dissent is a direction in
which the Supreme Court could go and which some members of the
Court would probably like to go. One could well ask why the federal
government feels the need to prosecute a series of robberies in Beau-
mont, Texas by apparently local criminals and how the federal law en-
forcement effort would be damaged if they could not. There is no
133. United States v. Hickman, 179 F.3 d 230 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (per curiam).
134. Id. at 231 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
135. 317 U.S. iii (1942).
136. Hickman, 179 F.3d at 231 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 238 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) ("Robbery is not selling, buying, or bartering, and it
does not produce anything.").
138. Id. at 236 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 232 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566
(1995)).
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suggestion in Hickman, nor in the myriad other robbery cases prosecuted
by the federal government, that the states are not doing, or cannot do,
the job.
However, in my view, the Hickman dissent misreads Lopez, espe-
cially in light of Morrison and Jones. By focusing on the crime's not being
commercial activity, Judge Higgenbotham has missed the point. Accord-
ing to Lopez, Congress has the power to "protect the instrumentalities of
commerce" from crime, including "the destruction of aircraft" and
"thefts from interstate commerce."'4 Thus, any crime can fall under fed-
eral jurisdiction if it interferes with the instrumentalities of commerce,
even if the crime itself is not "commercial activity."
Most courts, however, do not consider a restaurant or store to be an
"instrumentality of commerce" like an airplane or a truck, although that
is not obvious. 4' Therefore we turn to the third Lopez category: "Con-
gress's power to regulate those activities having a substantial effect on
commerce."'" It is already settled by Katzenbach v. McClung that opera-
tion of a restaurant has such an effect at least if "it serves or offers to
serve interstate travelers or a substantial portion of the food which it
serves... has moved in interstate commerce."'43 A Hardees restaurant
and an AutoZone store are, by virtue of being national chains, even
more involved in interstate commerce than was the locally owned Ollie's
Barbeque in McClung. In other words, even if we concede that the crime
is not a commercial or economic activity, as long as that crime is aimed at
commercial activity, Lopez is satisfied, just as when crime is aimed at an
"instrumentality of commerce." Any doubt on this score was cleared up
by Jones's distinction between private and rental property as a subject of
arson.
Furthermore, while a gross restriction on the federal government's
robbery jurisdiction would perhaps not unduly interfere with its ability to
vindicate its core concerns, the reasoning of the Hickman dissent would
apply equally to extortion, and this would cause serious problems. The
Hobbs Act's extortion provision is particularly important in fighting two
of the federal government's major concerns: organized crime and its
handmaiden, corruption of state and local officials. The use of extortion
by organized criminals in "protection rackets," as discussed in the refer-
140. 514 U.S. at 558.
141. A venue, such as a restaurant, in which commerce takes place could easily be seen as an "in-
strumentality of commerce," as could a warehouse where trucks unload. But there seems to be general
agreement that "instrumentalities" is limited to vehicles. See United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3 d 569, 588
(3d Cir. 1995).
142. 514 U.S. at 558-59.
143. 379 U.S. 294, 298 (1964).
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ence to United States v. Tropiano above, 1" is well known. But the Hobbs
Act also applies to extortion "under color of official right."'45 This applies
to extortionate threats by public officials (e.g., "If you don't pay me off
you'll never do business in this county again."), as well as the giving and
acceptance of bribes.,46 Under the reasoning of the Hickman dissent,
since extortion is no more a "commercial activity" than robbery, the
Hobbs Act could not be used unless the government could prove that
"an organized crime group committed various" extortions that them-
selves had a substantial effect on interstate commerce.'47 However, as ar-
gued above, this is an unduly restrictive reading of the Lopez/Morrison/
Jones trilogy.
Even if the extremely narrow reasoning of Hickman is not em-
ployed, Morrison and Jones suggest that extortion must nevertheless be
aimed at commercial activity -extortion, like robbery, of a private indi-
vidual is not enough. This raises questions about the scope of "commer-
cial activity." In United States v. Stillo, a defense attorney paid off a judge
to dismiss a series of criminal cases against his client. 48 The government
tried the case under the standard "depletion of assets" approach-
showing that the lawyer's firm purchased supplies in interstate commerce
and that money given in bribes was not available to make interstate pur-
chases. 49 The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Lopez was inapplica-
ble because extortion is "economic activity" and the Hobbs Act includes
the "affecting interstate commerce" language absent in the Gun Free
Schools Zone statute.5 More relevant, declared the court, was Robert-
son'5' (the gold mine case), where a RICO conviction was upheld because
the gold mine purchased supplies from out of state.'
52
I disagree with the court's reasoning, though not its result. First, as
discussed, it is unlikely that extortion is the sort of commercial activity
that the Supreme Court had in mind in Lopez. Second, the Hobbs Act is
not automatically exempt from Lopez problems merely because of its
"affecting commerce" language. Third, the "depletion of assets" ap-
proach is troubling because it, or related reasoning, like the govern-
ment's argument in Lopez and Morrison, can be applied to almost any
144. See supra text accompanying note 92.
145. i8 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2oo).
146. See supra text accompanying note IO7.
147. United States v. Hickman, 179 F.3d 230, 236 (5th Cir. i999) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
148. 57 F.3d 553, 555-56 (7th Cir. 1995).
149. Id. at 558.
150. Id. at 558 n.2.
151. United States v. Robertson, 514 U.S. 669, 67 -72 (1995).
152. Stillo, 57 F.3d at 558 n.2.
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crime.'53 Murder, for example, also interferes with the victim's ability to
make purchases in interstate commerce. Also, just because the firm had
made purchases in interstate commerce in the past does not prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the bribe money would have gone for an
interstate purchase. In fact, the lawyer's bribes in Stillo no doubt had the
net effect of increasing the firm's or the lawyer's assets-otherwise why
would he give them? Thus "depletion of assets," particularly in a bribery
case, is a legal fiction.'54
A more straightforward approach would be to concede that extor-
tion or other crime against an individual which does not directly target
his business assets is not covered by the Hobbs Act. But extortion in the
course of, or aimed at, one's business-even if it is a business with a less
direct connection to interstate commerce than the robberies in Hick-
man-is nevertheless "commerce" within the spirit of Lopez and Morri-
son. It satisfies the Hobbs Act because the aggregate effect of such
extortionate activity would be deleterious to interstate commerce. Such
aggregation is explicitly allowed by Lopez.'55 The criminal court system
of the city of Chicago has at least as much connection to interstate com-
merce as does Ollie's Barbeque. A showing of depletion of assets in the
individual case is thus not necessary.
In Stillo, if criminals were routinely allowed to go free by bribing
judges, the nation's commerce, indeed its very structure, would be at risk.
Business related bribes and extortion strike at the very heart of the na-
tion's commerce. Moreover, since local authorities are, by definition,
corrupt in these cases, it is particularly necessary for the federal govern-
ment to have prosecutorial authority. Therefore, Mr. Stillo loses, not be-
cause the bribe depleted the assets of the lawyer's firm and not because
this bribery had any direct effect on commerce, de minimis or otherwise,
but because bribery of judges in the course of their business is "commer-
cial activity" and does, in the aggregate, affect interstate commerce.
In sum, the government must prove the element "affecting interstate
commerce" in every Hobbs Act case. After Jones, it is clear that robbery
or extortion of a private individual for reasons unrelated to his business
153. Also, occasionally a court will find that the government has failed to establish a sufficient
nexus to commerce. E.g., United State v. Elders, 569 F.2d 1020 (7 th Cir. 1978).
154. It is easier to argue that, when a zoning commissioner demands $5000 to rezone an area be-
fore a business can be built, he has depleted that business of assets that would be used to make pur-
chases in commerce. Even here, although the consequence of refusing to make a payoff is inability to
conduct business, the net effect of the bribe on commerce may be positive (though the Hobbs Act
does not require a negative effect).
155. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) ("[W]here a general regulatory statute bears
a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that
statute is of no consequence.").
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do not qualify for federal jurisdiction. The proper way to establish "af-
fecting commerce" is not to show that the business that was the "victim"
of the extortion or robbery made purchases in interstate commerce and
that their ability to do so in the future would be impeded as a result of
the crime. Rather, the government should simply show that robberies or
extortions of businesses have, cumulatively, an adverse effect on inter-
state commerce, even if, as in Wickard v. Filburn, this business does not
make any transactions in interstate commerce itself.
B. WEAPONS OFFENSES
Because Lopez was a gun possession case, the status of other weap-
ons offenses may be called into question. The lower courts, however,
have had no difficulty with these cases because the statutes refer to inter-
state commerce whereas the Gun Free School Zone Act did not. I, 6 Thus,
in a typical case, United States v. Jones,5 7 the court dealt with 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) which makes it unlawful for convicted felons, narcotics addicts,
illegal aliens, and other specified persons "to ship or transport in inter-
state or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any
[specified] firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammuni-
tion which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign com-
merce."' 58 Since this statute "contains a jurisdictional element, explicitly
requiring a nexus between the possession of firearms and interstate com-
merce,' '59 the court held that convictions under this statute, even for
mere possession, raise no problems under Lopez or Morrison:
[Section] 922(g) can rationally be seen as regulating the interstate
transportation of firearms and ammunition and so constitutes a valid
exercise of Congress's power to regulate in the second of [the three
Lopez] categories. It can also be seen as falling within the third cate-
gory, which requires only a minimal nexus that the firearm in question
have moved in interstate commerce at some time. I6°
The First Circuit has held that possession of a single bullet that had
moved in commerce is sufficient.
6
'
In the pre-Lopez case of United States v. Scarborough, the Supreme
Court upheld a conviction like Jones's, brushing aside the fact that the
statute does not punish mere possession but rather possession "in or af-
156. See United States v. Jones, 231 F.3d 508, 514 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Every Court of Appeals that
has considered this issue has concluded that § 922(g)(8) is a valid exercise of Congress's power under
the Commerce Clause.") (citing cases).
157. Id.
158. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000) (emphasis added).
159. Jones, 231 F.3d at 54.
16o. Id. (citations omitted).
161. United States v. Cardoza, 129 F.3 d 6, 1i (ist Cir. 1997).
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fecting commerce. ' But possession of a gun, or a bullet, that, at some
uncertain time in the past, was shipped interstate is hardly "in or affect-
ing commerce."
It is not surprising that the lower courts continue to rely on Scarbor-
ough,6' but Scarborough was not reaffirmed in Lopez and, in my view, is
now bad law.' 64 Unlike robbing a business, possession of a gun, as Lopez
noted, has no direct effect on commerce, and the indirect effect is very
remote. Moreover, the statute by its terms does not prohibit merely pos-
sessing a gun that has moved in interstate commerce but proof that the
gun is "in or affecting commerce." Congress can certainly prohibit the
shipment in commerce of guns to various people, and ordering of guns by
them, but under the new Lopez/Morrison/Jones regime, these convic-
tions for mere possession are defective on statutory grounds, without
reaching the constitutional issue.'65 By contrast, possession of a weapon
by such person on a bus, or with the intention to rob a store, would be
possession "in or affecting commerce."
A different problem is posed by the new § 922(q) which Congress
reenacted after Lopez.' 66 The statute now includes a finding that "fire-
arms and ammunition move easily in interstate commerce and have been
found in increasing numbers in and around schools." '6' Section
922(q)(2)(A) now makes it a crime to "knowingly possess a firearm that
has moved in or otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce at a
place that the individual knows, or has reason to know, is a school zone."
Unlike § 922(g), this statute directly makes possession a crime with past
movement in commerce sufficient to establish jurisdiction. However, just
because a gun has passed in interstate commerce hardly satisfies Lopez's
"substantial effect" requirement. Also, as Lopez held, gun possession is
162. 431 U.S. 563, 578 ('977).
163. Compare United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242 (5 th Cir. 1996) (expressing doubts about,
but following, Scarborough), with United States v. Luna, 165 F-3d 316, 322 (5 th Cir. 1999) (upholding a
§ 9220) conviction as consistent with Congress's power without relying on Scarborough).
164. Professors Brandon Denning and Glenn Reynolds agree that the view of the courts of appeals
upholding this statute "cannot be correct." Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and
Resistance: The New Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts, 55 ARK. L. REV.
1253, 1272 (2o03).
165. But see Elizabeth Saylor, Federalism and the Family After Morrison: An Examination of the
Child Support Recovery Act, The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, and a Federal Law Out-
lawing Gun Possession by Domestic Violence Abusers, 25 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 132 (2002) (arguing
that the gun statutes are still valid after Morrison). Professor Merritt takes a similar view. Merritt, su-
pra note 114, at 717-20.
166. Pub. L. No. lO4-2o8 § 657, ito Stat. 3009-370 (1996). Congress also made findings about the
effect of firearm possession in and around schools while Lopez was pending, but the Court did not
consider these. United States v. Lopez, 5I4 U.S. 549, 563 n.4 (0995).
167. i8 U.S.C. § 922(q)(I)(C) (2000).
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not a commercial activity that can be aggregated. For this reason, plus
the fact that the Court could see this as Congress sticking its thumb in the
Court's eye, this statute may, and should, also be struck down.'18 Mere
passage in commerce at some prior date without the defendant's partici-
pation is hardly a "substantial effect" on commerce.'
69
Justice Department officials Harry Litman and Mark Greenberg,
however, argued in 1997 that mere passage in commerce was enough,
without the need to show a substantial effect:
[R]egardless of its purposes, Congress may, under the Commerce
Clause, regulate threats to health or safety that are caused by interstate
commerce.... Further, even were Commerce Clause doctrine to be
reconceptualized to limit Congress to certain purposes, preventing in-
terstate commerce from being a vehicle of injury to health and safety
would be an entirely appropriate purpose. 7
I agree up to a point. Just because something that is not inherently
dangerous, though, such as film or handguns (which in Congress's view
are not inherently dangerous) has at some point passed in interstate
commerce is hardly a sufficient basis for federal jurisdiction. Congress
can certainly regulate the shipping of guns by and to felons, illegal immi-
grants, etc. However, when it prohibits the possession of something that
at one time passed in interstate commerce it has gone beyond its author-
ity to regulate commerce and is instead engaged in crime fighting. But
Lopez is clear: Congress is only entitled to fight crime that has a substan-
tial effect on commerce. Lopez itself rejected essentially this argument as
to handguns when it dismissed the government's "impact of guns on
commerce argument" as to the original Gun Free Schools Zones Act. 7'
What then of more serious weapons like hand grenades'72 and ma-
chine guns? Section 922(0) declares that it is unlawful for a person "to
transfer or possess a machinegun" without any reference to interstate
168. But see United States v. Danks, 221 F.3d 1037, 1039 (8th Cir. 1999) (upholding the new stat-
ute). If the Court strikes down convictions under this statute, convictions under § 9226), which forbids
possession of a stolen firearm that has moved in commerce, would also be defective. But see United
States v. Luna, 165 F.3d 316, 325-26 (5th Cir. 1999) (upholding such a conviction).
169. Contra Brickey, supra note 21, at 832 (writing before Jones and Morrison, hypothesizing this
statute prior to its passage and arguing that "possession of a gun ten years after it was shipped in inter-
state commerce can be reached under the Commerce Clause").
17o. Harry Litman & Mark Greenberg, Federal Power and Federalism: A Theory of Commerce-
Clause Based Regulation of Traditionally State Crimes, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 921, 926 (I997).
171. See supra text accompanying note 41.
172. The National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5812(b) (2ooo), forbids possession of unregistered
hand grenades. In United States v. Freed, the Supreme Court upheld a conviction under the statute
despite the absence of an scienter requirement. 4oi U.S. 6oi, 607-1O (i971). The statute does not refer
to interstate commerce either, but that issue was not before the Court. The definition of "firearm"
includes machine guns, sawed-off shotguns and various "destructive devices" including bombs and
hand grenades. 26 U.S.C. § 5845.
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commerce.'73 The courts of appeals nonetheless all agree that this statute
survives a Lopez challenge."' The Second Circuit explained in United
States v. Franklyn:
We distinguish Lopez on the ground that § 922(0), by contrast with
§ 922(q), is integral to a larger federal scheme for the regulation of
trafficking in firearms-an economic activity with strong interstate ef-
fects.... [Slection 922(0) fits into the overall regulation of the interna-
tional and interstate market in weapons deemed particularly dangerous
by Congress. Section 922(a) places restrictions on the international and
interstate shipment of firearms generally. Section 922(b)(4) forbids the
sale or delivery of machine guns by licensed importers, manufacturers,
dealers, or collectors except as specifically authorized by the Secretary
of Defense.'75
Indeed, Lopez noted that § 922(q) (the Gun Free School Zones Act)
"represents a sharp break with the longstanding pattern of federal fire-
arms regulation," 7 suggesting that the Court is probably prepared to ac-
cept Congress's extensive regulation of certain particularly dangerous
firearms, even though the link to interstate commerce in individual cases
may be attenuated.
In United States v. Rybar, the Third Circuit concluded that
[c]ongressional findings generated throughout Congress' history of
firearms regulation link both the flow of firearms across state lines and
their consequential indiscriminate availability with the resulting violent
criminal acts that are beyond the effective control of the states. 7
Dissenting Judge Alito objected to this since there have been no
findings as to the effect of the intrastate possession of machine guns on
commerce and such effect is not obvious. 7 The Second Circuit, however,
agreed with the Rybar majority, holding that "Congress's intent to regu-
late possession and transfer of machine guns as a means of stemming in-
terstate gun trafficking is manifest.'
' 79
This seems reasonable. The states are not in a good position to regu-
late the national and international trade in especially dangerous weapons
like machine guns and hand grenades, and having a federal offense for
possession of such weapons, even if it cannot, or need not, be proved that
the weapons have moved in or affected interstate commerce, seems like a
reasonable aspect of that regulatory authority. Congress, moreover, has
173. i8 U.S.C. § 922(0) (2000).
174. PETER Low, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW i6i (2d ed. 2003).
175. 157 F.3d 90, 94 (1998) (citations omitted).
176. 514 U.S. at 563 (citation omitted).
177. io3 F.3d 273, 279 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 807 (I997).
178. Id. at 293 (Alito, J., dissenting).
179. Franklyn, 157 F.3d at 96 (quoting Rybar, 103 F.3d at 282).
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made findings about the effects of these weapons on commerce. On the
other hand, criminalizing possession of handguns, which are not highly
regulated, and as to which state laws vary, does not seem like such a
compelling federal interest or to have such an obvious effect on com-
merce,'8 though gun possession by felons and narcotics addicts certainly
poses a more direct threat to commerce than does possession by some-
one in a school zone.
Admittedly, the above reasoning is not self-evident.'8' The more ob-
vious order of vulnerability of the statutes is that convictions under
§ 922(0), with no reference to commerce, are the most vulnerable. Con-
victions under § 922(g), with a requirement of affecting commerce that is
not being proved, are also likely to be reversed, whereas convictions un-
der the new § 922(q), which forbids possession of a weapon that has trav-
eled in interstate commerce, are the safest. I am predicting, however, that
§ 922(q) and § 922(g) convictions are more likely to be reversed, whereas
§ 922(0) convictions will likely be upheld. This is based on the language
of Morrison suggesting that the mere presence of a jurisdictional hook in
a statute is not dispositive, as well as the political consideration that the
Court is more likely to support Congress's findings and general authority
in the area of particularly dangerous weapons rather than handguns.
That is, regulation of hand grenades and machine guns is a "truly na-
tional" concern. 2 Further, the Court may not accept Congress's attempt
to "overrule" Lopez.
C. CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
The Child Restoration and Penalties Act of 199 o '83 is a statute that
allows prosecution based on a very remote connection to commerce.'84
The statute prohibits possession of child pornography that has either
been shipped in interstate commerce or "which was produced using
materials which have been mailed or so shipped or transported by any
means including computer."' 5 Thus, using film that has traveled in
interstate commerce to make child pornography is enough to qualify the
defendant for prosecution. The Third Circuit considered the
18o. This is despite my personal view, developed as a prosecutor, that the sale of handguns to (and
possession by) anyone should be seriously restricted.
I81. Indeed, Professors Denning and Reynolds argue that while "a federal statute aimed at
staunching any interstate traffic in machine guns could.., be drafted," § 922(0) is defective under
Morrison. Denning & Reynolds, supra note 164, at 1279. I think § 922(0) is good enough.
182. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000).
183. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2000).
184. This statute was changed in 1996 and portions of it were struck down on First Amendment
grounds by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. The Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
185. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).
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constitutionality of a conviction under this statute in United States v.
Rodia.'86
While other courts have simply upheld this statute because it con-
tains a reference to commerce, ' the Third Circuit rightly concluded, as I
argued above, that the mere presence of a jurisdictional hook in the stat-
ute could not be considered dispositive.' Rather, the courts should in-
dependently examine the crime in question and determine if it falls into
one of the three Lopez categories: "In Lopez the Court did not simply
state or imply that all criminal statutes must have such an element, or
that all statutes with such an element would be constitutional.... "'8,
However, the court then went on to uphold the statute, albeit with
reservations,'" citing the machine gun cases:
By outlawing the purely intrastate possession of child pornogra-
phy... Congress can curb the nationwide demand for these materials.
We believe that such possession "through repetition elsewhere," helps
to create and sustain a market for sexually explicit materials depicting
minors.' 9'
In other words, similarly to Wickard, Congress is trying to regulate
an interstate market in a commodity which is presumably illegal in all the
states but hard to regulate. Congress has rationally concluded that an ef-
fective means of doing so is to curb demand by, in this case, criminalizing
possession of the commodity. This view is shared by the First,' Fifth,'93
Seventh," and Eighth'95 Circuits.
This is a sound distinction from Lopez if the pornography is com-
mercially produced (as machine guns are). While misuse of handguns
certainly wreaks more havoc in society than possession of child pornog-
raphy or machine guns, the mere possession of handguns is generally le-
gal whereas the possession of machine guns and child pornography is not.
Moreover, the latter two commodities are subject to a substantial, illegal,
interstate traffic which is difficult for the states to stop. Accordingly, it is
186. 194 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 1999).
187. See, e.g., United States v. Bausch, i4o F.3 d 739, 741 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing cases), cert. denied,
525 U.S. 1072 (1999).
188. Rodia, i94 F.3d at 472-73.
189. Id. at 473. (quoting Andrew St. Laurent, Reconstituting United States v. Lopez: Another Look
at Federal Criminal Law, 31 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 61, 112 (1998)).
i9o. Id. at 468 ("Although we are not without misgivings given the breadth of the regulation at
issue....").
191. Id. at 476 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 137 F.3d 652, 656 (Ist Cir. 1998) (quoting
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,567 (I995))).
192. United States v. Robinson, 137 F.3d 652 (ist Cir. 1998).
193. United States v. Kallestad, 236 F.3 d 225 (5th Cir. 2000).
194. United States v. Angle, 234 F.3d 326 (7th Cir. 2000).
195. United States v. Bausch, 14o F.3d 749 (8th Cir. 1998). cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1072 (I999).
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within the power of Congress, in trying to limit such possession generally,
to forbid purely intrastate possession, regardless of whether a jurisdic-
tional element appears in the statute or is proved in the individual case.
However, it appears that the child pornography in Rodia was not
commercially produced. 96 Possession by an individual of pornography
that he produced himself and did not intend for commercial use does not
fall within the federal ambit any more than marijuana possession'97 or ar-
son of a private home. This is what the Ninth Circuit held in United States
v. McCoy. 95 In McCoy, a mother was prosecuted for a single family pic-
ture in which the genital area of herself and her ten-year-old daughter
was exposed.'99 This photo was apparently the result of alcohol induced
indiscretion on the part of the parents (the stepfather took the picture)
rather than any prurient intent." Federal jurisdiction was based on the
fact that the camera and film had been produced out of state."0 '
The Ninth Circuit distinguished Wickard on the ground that the pri-
vate production in this case was not connected to any interstate "mar-
ket ..... Unlike Wickard's wheat, home production of this picture did not
mean that the defendant then bought less pornography interstate, since
there was no indication that the defendant had ever bought or intended
to buy, pornography at all.2" Considering Morrison's four criteria for
"substantial effect on commerce," the court in McCoy concluded that
there was none.2" 4 The Sixth Circuit similarly struck down a conviction
based on personal photographs where the only link to interstate com-
merce was the out-of-state production of the paper on which the photos
were printed."
If the Supreme Court is serious about federalism principles, it should
agree with the Ninth Circuit. Clearly the effect on interstate commerce of
possession of privately produced and used child pornography, based
196. 194 F.3d at 469 ("The material creating the purported jurisdictional hook in this case was the
Polaroid film with which Rodia's pictures were taken. It is undisputed that Polaroid film has never
been manufactured in New Jersey ..."). The court later refers to the pornography as "home grown."
Id. at 477.
197. See infra text accompanying notes 215-17.
198. 323 F.3d i 114 (9th Cir. 2003). The court in McCoy specifically likened the case to possession
of a single marijuana cigarette. Id. at 1122.
199. Id. at 1115.
200. Id. at 1134 (Trott, J., dissenting).
2o. Id. at 1126.
202. Id. at 1122.
203. Id. If the defendant was found in possession of other, out-of-state pornography, it would have
strengthened the government's Wickard argument, but since he could in any case be prosecuted for
the out-of-state pornography, it would not matter.
204. Id. at 1133.
205. United States v. Corp, 236 F.3d 325, 326, 332-33 (6th Cir. 2001).
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solely on the fact that the film or camera had traveled in interstate com-
merce, is too attenuated to form a basis for federal jurisdiction after
Morrison. The attempts to distinguish this crime, which conservatives
obviously want to prosecute, offered in the courts of appeals are uncon-
vincing.1 The best argument for federal jurisdiction is that, as discussed
above, Congress can prohibit possession of child pornography generally
and is not required to distinguish between that which is privately and that
which is commercially produced, since it all tends to harm the child in-
volved and at least has the potential to contribute to the national mar-
ket.2" However, as Jones makes clear, the activity in each case must be
"commercial" in nature. °8 The defendant's acts in McCoy, conceded
even by the dissent to be "non-commercial," simply do not qualify."°
D. RICO
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO"), I8 U.S.C. § 1962(a), forbids using the proceeds of racketeer-
ing activity to acquire an enterprise "engaged in or the activities of which
affect interstate or foreign commerce." Section 1962(b) forbids the use of
racketeering activities to acquire such an enterprise, and § 1962(c) for-
bids "conduct[ing] or participat[ing] ... in the conduct of such enter-
prise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity...." Robertson
was a prosecution under § 1962(a) where the defendant used the pro-
ceeds of narcotics offenses to buy a gold mine. Since the gold mine was
engaged in commerce, the Court had no difficulty upholding the convic-
tion. In United State v. Riddle, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a RICO convic-
tion under § 1962(c) involving an intrastate gambling operation which
engaged in various interstate transactions to further the affairs of the
business."I A de minimis effect on commerce was found sufficient.' In
2o6. See, e.g., United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3 d 465, 477-78 (3d Cir. 1999) (advancing the theory
that possession of "home grown" pornography may create an "addiction" that will lead the possessor
into the interstate market, though Congress made no such finding). But see McCoy, 323 F.3d at I 121
(dismissing this theory).
207. This is similar to the argument that Judge Trott made in his dissenting opinion in McCoy. 323
F.3d at 1133 (Trott, J., dissenting).
2o8. Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 854 (2000).
209. McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1134 (Trott, J., dissenting). Judge Trott argues that since the statute itself
is a legitimate exercise of federal power, it does not matter that individual defendants are prosecuted
for non-commercial activities. See id. at 134-35 ("[Tjhe de minimis nature of individual instances aris-
ing under this statute is of no consequence." (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558
(1995))). The Supreme Court's point, however, was that a "substantial" effect on commerce need not
be shown, not that the activity in question could be totally non-commercial.
210. 249 F.3d 529, 537 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 930 (2ooi).
2I1. Id.
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United States v. Juvenile Male, the Ninth Circuit upheld a RICO convic-
tion involving a series of Hobbs Act robberies by a juvenile gang."'
RICO presents a double opportunity for the government to establish
jurisdiction since it will suffice if the enterprise either directly, as in
Robertson and Riddle, or indirectly through the pattern crimes, as in Ju-
venile Male, affects commerce. Thus, while extortion or robbery of a pri-
vate individual and arson of a private home no longer qualify for federal
jurisdiction, if any of these activities are undertaken by an enterprise that
independently affects commerce, such as an organized gang, then federal
jurisdiction will lie, using state law arson, robbery, or extortion statutes as
the "pattern of racketeering activity." Alternatively, a series of private
robberies or arsons by such a gang could itself have a substantial effect
on commerce, and the relevant federal statutes could be used as the pat-
tern crimes. This is a particularly gratifying result since it allows the
courts to trim federal jurisdiction as to crimes by individuals but still
gives the federal government the ability to prosecute such crimes when
perpetrated by commerce-affecting enterprises such as organized crime.
E. NARCOTICS OFFENSES
Title 21, section 841(a)(I) makes it a crime "to manufacture, distrib-
ute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dis-
pense, a controlled substance ... " Interstate commerce is not
mentioned, but in § 8oi, Congress found that:
(2) The illegal importation, manufacture, distribution and possession
and improper use of controlled substances have a substantial and det-
rimental effect on the health and general welfare of the American
people.
(3) A major portion of the traffic in controlled substances flows
through interstate or foreign commerce. Incidents of the traffic which
are not an integral part of the interstate or foreign flow ... nonetheless
have a substantial and direct effect upon commerce ....
In general, narcotics offenses are commercial activities and therefore
pose no Lopez problems, which Robertson made clear.1 3 The Court is
undoubtedly prepared to accept Congress's findings as to the effect of
the narcotics trade on interstate commerce and not require that it be
proved in an individual case.
By contrast, "manufacture" of marijuana for personal use is argua-
bly not itself a commercial activity. But the courts have had no difficulty
holding, as in Wickard v. Filburn, that personal production of this agri-
212. 118 F. 3 d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1997). See also United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641,674 (2d Cir.
1997) (involving a narcotics distribution operation).
213. See also United States v. Pompey, 264 F.3d 1176, 118o (ioth Cir. 2oot).
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cultural commodity affects the interstate market ' 4 by reducing demand
for a commercially produced product. However, § 844 also prohibits sim-
ple possession of controlled substances. Since possession of small
amounts of drugs is certainly not "commercial activity," and conse-
quently cannot be aggregated, unlike growing wheat in Wickard, the
Court should strike down § 844 at least as to marijuana and other drugs
that may have been produced locally."5 It could be argued that, as with
machine guns, narcotics, including marijuana, have long been subject to
federal regulation and are, in Congress's view, dangerous substances.
However, to argue that marijuana specifically is more dangerous than
handguns and as dangerous as machine guns is ridiculous in light of stud-
ies showing it not to be especially dangerous at all." 6 Moreover, six states
have authorized marijuana for medical use, and Canada has legalized its
possession.' I do not, however, predict such a ruling from the Supreme
Court.
F. CARJACKING
The federal carjacking statute punishes anyone who "with the intent
to cause death or serious bodily harm takes a motor vehicle that has been
transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce from
the person or presence of another by force and violence or by intimida-
tion....""s
Since carjacking is a more commercially oriented activity than pos-
session of a gun, the courts of appeals have unanimously upheld convic-
tions under this statute simply because the car has at some point been
shipped in interstate commerce. 9 This misses the point of Lopez. As-
suming the carjackings are of private individuals, the reasoning above
concerning the Hobbs Act would apply equally here. As I read Lopez
214. E.g., Proyect v. United States, iol F.3d II, 13-14 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Leshuk, 65
F.3 d 1105, 1111-12 (4 th Cir. 1995).
215. See United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003) (dictum). Cf United States v.
Peterson, 236 F.3d 848, 855-57 (7th Cir. 2001) (reversing a Hobbs Act conviction for robbery of a
marijuana seller on the ground that the government had not established that the victim's marijuana
business affected interstate commerce, but distinguishing the drug control statutes based on congres-
sional findings.).
216. See generally Californians for Compassionate Use, Medical Research and Reports, at
http://www.marijuana.orgJResearchPage.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2004) (a pro-marijuana website).
Admittedly, there are other studies finding marijuana to be dangerous in various ways but generally
not more so than alcohol. But see National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign, at http://www.
freevibe.com/Drug-Facts/mj.asp (last visited Jan. 24, 2o4) (an anti-marijuana website).
217. Californians for Compassionate Use, Medical Research and Reports, at http://www.marijuana
.org/ResearchPage.html.
218. I8 U.S.C. § 21I9 (2000).
219. See United States v. Cobb, 144 F.3d 319, 320-21 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing cases from seven cir-
cuits).
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and Morrison, few crimes are "commercial activity" per se.22 Conse-
quently, aggregation of the effects of many carjackings is not permitted.
Plus, the mere fact that the car has passed in interstate commerce at
some point is too attenuated to have a substantial effect on commerce
under the Morrison criteria. Instead, either the victim or the criminal en-
terprise must be engaged in commerce. (Thus, a ring of carjackers who
robbed cars from private individuals and then sold them interstate would
violate RICO because of the nature of their enterprise, not because the
cars had at some prior time moved in commerce.) The lower federal
courts, on the one hand complaining bitterly about Congress's overbur-
dening them with criminal matters, have again declined an invitation by
the Supreme Court to narrow their jurisdiction."'
In United States v. Bishop, the Third Circuit argued that cars are "in-
strumentalities of interstate commerce" and, as such, qualify under the
second Lopez category even if their theft cannot be said to "affect com-
merce" under the third." ' This expands the "instrumentality" concept too
far. Unlike a train or a semi-trailer truck, a car is generally not an in-
strumentality of interstate commerce. Therefore, to qualify under Lo-
pez's second category, the government would have to prove in the
individual case that a car was in fact being used as an instrumentality of
commerce for federal jurisdiction to lie. Alternatively, under Jones, use
of the car for local pizza deliveries, even by a non-chain local store,
would suffice since, once "commerce" is involved, a connection to inter-
state commerce is inevitable and need not be proved by the facts of the
individual case," 3 or aggregation could be employed.
There is another argument that has been used by some courts that is
a more convincing defense of the carjacking statute. In United States v.
Cortes, the Ninth Circuit did not rely on the car's previous passage in in-
terstate commerce or claim it was an "instrumentality" of commerce. 4
Rather, it pointed to congressional findings that cars stolen intrastate are
disassembled in professional "chop shops" where the parts are then sold
220. The exceptions may be crimes like receipt of stolen property, loansharking, and securities
fraud, which mimic ordinary commercial transactions. These crimes likely affect commerce anyway,
though.
221. But see Drew Blatt, Casenote, The Federal Carjacking Statute Under Commercial Clause Scru-
tiny After Lopez: United States v. Mchenry, 97 F.3 d 125 (6th Cir. 1996), 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 747, 771
(1998) (arguing that the carjacking statute survives constitutional scrutiny because carjacking affects
interstate commerce).
222. 66 F.3 d 569,588 (3d Cir. 1995). But see id. at 597 (Becker, J., dissenting).
223. That is, the government could offer boilerplate expert opinion that any business affects inter-
state commerce or, as would usually be the case, get a stipulation to this effect.
224. 299 F.3d 1030, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2002).
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in interstate and foreign commerce.225 Still, the government should have
to show some intent by the defendant to do such a thing, rather than just
use the car for his own purposes, before federal jurisdiction could be es-
tablished.
G. FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO CLINIC ENTRANCES ACT ("FACE")
Another statute that has been the subject of many unsuccessful ap-
peals is FACE. This statute provides criminal and civil penalties against
anyone who "injures, intimidates or interferes" with anyone "from ob-
taining or providing reproductive health services."22' Again the courts of
appeals have been unanimous in upholding FACE against Morrison and
Lopez challenges, though there have been some strong dissents.227 The
courts are clearly correct. Under the Hobbs Act analysis above, since
abortion clinics are commercial enterprises, interfering with them is a le-
gitimate concern of Congress. The fact that the statute does not contain
jurisdictional language is irrelevant since every commercial enterprise
"affects interstate commerce" and the individual effects can be aggre-
gated. It is likewise insignificant that the defendant's acts of "injuring, in-
timidating or interfering" are not "commercial," as the dissenting judges
have argued."' Robbery is also not commercial, but robbery of a com-
mercial enterprise is a Hobbs Act violation.
H. SUMMARY OF PRINCIPLES
The following principles can be distilled from the discussion of the
statutes and cases above. First, federal jurisdiction under the Commerce
Clause is limited to commercial activity plus regulation of the channels
and instrumentalities of commerce. Crimes aimed at private individuals,
homes or cars, as well as statutes criminalizing the behavior of individu-
als are no longer constitutional unless a direct and substantial impact on
225. Id.
226. 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(I) (2000).
227. See, e.g., United States v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 261 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 971
(2001) (citing cases). But see id. at 268 (Weis, J., dissenting). The majority had this response to the dis-
sent:
The dissent characterizes the connection between clinic blockades and interstate commerce
as the same attenuated "but-for-causal-chain" ... rejected by the Court in Morrison. This
view narrowly focuses on the activity regulated by FACE in the abstract and fails to ac-
knowledge the national market for reproductive health services in the country. Congress
determined that the abortion provider shortage in the United States has resulted in a na-
tional market for abortion services. In this context, abortion related violence committed to
close down a reproductive health clinic... has a direct effect on interstate commerce.
Id. at 266 n.4. This provides an additional reason beyond the more fundamental analysis offered in the
text.
228. See NOW 1, 510 U.S. 249, 260 (1994) (holding that politically, rather than economically, moti-
vated extortion directed at abortion clinics violates the Hobbs Act).
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commerce can be shown in the individual case. Crimes aimed at com-
mercial activity, by contrast, can be aggregated to show a substantial ef-
fect on commerce. Thus, robbery of a pizza deliveryman while he is on
duty violates the Hobbs Act. Robbery of him off-duty does not.229
Second, economically motivated crimes such as robbery, extortion,
and carjacking are not "commercial activity." For those crimes to be
prosecuted by the federal government, they must be aimed at commer-
cial activity. That term, however, includes the business activities of law-
yers, doctors, public officials, etc. In other words, "commerce" is not
limited to buying and selling. It is unclear whether some business crimes,
like loansharking or securities fraud, are themselves "commerce," but it
does not matter since they invariably affect commerce.
Third, it is neither necessary nor dispositive for the statute to contain
jurisdictional language or a congressional finding of an effect on com-
merce, though these are helpful. The courts must make their own deci-
sions on the "substantial effects" issue in each case.
Fourth, the mere fact that something may once have moved in inter-
state commerce, without the connivance of the defendant, is not enough
to establish federal jurisdiction. Shipment, ordering, and receipt of ob-
jects in commerce, however, are subject to federal jurisdiction, as is trav-
eling interstate to commit a crime.
Fifth, the Supreme Court is likely to accept longstanding congres-
sional regulation of narcotics and certain dangerous weapons, even if a
direct effect on commerce in a particular statute has not been shown, be-
cause of congressional findings that these crimes generally have a delete-
rious effect on commerce. However, mere possession of handguns,
privately produced marijuana, and privately produced child pornography
is too remote from commerce to justify continued federal jurisdiction. I
do not expect the Supreme Court to adopt this position as to marijuana
and child pornography. All of the other points, by contrast, express my
sense of the thrust of the Supreme Court's opinions and where the Court
is likely to go in the future.
CONCLUSION
This Article concludes that the Lopez/Morrison/Jones trilogy sug-
gests that the Court is in the process of making a meaningful, but not
dramatic or disastrous, trimming of federal jurisdiction under the Com-
229. A question arises as to what the defendant's mens rea must be as to the "commerce" element.
In United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 683-84 (1975), the Supreme Court made it clear that strict li-
ability could be applied to such a jurisdictional element absent congressional intent to the contrary. Of
course, the issue of robbery of an off-duty delivery boy while he still has the proceeds of his night's
work will pose a problem. (I say that it affects commerce since the money belongs to the business.)
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merce Clause. It argues that two types of statutes will be narrowed: those
that contain a jurisdictional "hook" but where the activity in question
does not in fact substantially affect commerce and those where the victim
is private property or a private individual-crimes which cannot be ag-
gregated with other crimes to show a substantial effect on commerce.
Moreover, the Court will also construe more statutes narrowly to ensure
that prosecutors do not exceed the express terms of the statute. If this is
the extent of the Court's incursion into federal criminal law, federal
prosecutors can live with it and federal criminal law will benefit from
more precise drafting and careful reading of the laws.
More generally, the limitation of federal Commerce Clause jurisdic-
tion to matters that actually do relate to commerce in a meaningful way
seems reasonable. The Gun Free School Zones Act neither contained
any jurisdictional element nor was based on findings that guns in school
zones meaningfully affect interstate commerce. Much more problematic
is when Congress has satisfied itself that a certain activity affects com-
merce and there is a "rational basis" 3' for that conclusion, as was the
case with the Violence Against Women Act. Now the Court is not
merely holding Congress within its constitutional authority but is substi-
tuting its own judgment for that of the legislative branch. 3' Just as there
is no limit to Congress's authority if the Court does not require a mean-
ingful connection to commerce for Commerce Clause-based legislation,
so there is no limit to the Court's authority if it can strike down legisla-
tion for which Congress had a rational basis for finding such a connec-
tion.
230. Lopez held that this is the appropriate test. 514 U.S. at 557.
231. For an insightful discussion of when the Court should defer to other branches' views of consti-
tutionality, see Dawn Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Non-judicial Interpretation: Who De-
termines Constitutional Meaning?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROaS. (forthcoming 2oo4).
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